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Hederal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Instice Washington 25, D. C.

August 24, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL VIA LIAISON

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building
Room 123
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The attached memorandum is for your information. As indicated therein, the information was obtained by an informant who has reported extremely reliable information in the past. I am unable to further evaluate this information tion other than to state that the informant is known to have been in a position to obtain this type of data. It is expected that he will also obtain valuable information in the future, and for his protection, it is requested that the attached memorandum be treated as Top Secret.

This information has also been furnished to the Attorney General; Honorable Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission; Brigadier General Edward H. Porter, USAF, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Jaint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Major General Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF; Major General Richard C. Partridge, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence; Major General John A. Bamford, Walter B. Smith, Under Secretary of State; Honorable James L. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

Attachment

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United States Department of Instice Bederal Bureau of Investigation Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE No.

August 24, 1953

The following information was furnished by an informant who has given extremely reliable information in the past. It purports to represent statements made by a Soviet official stationed in Europe. This official is believed to be attached to the new Ministry of Home Affairs, which was created after the death of Stalin through a consolidation of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security.

According to this official, for several days after the public announcement of the arrest of Laurenti Beria, the officials of his department (probably Foreign Section of the Ministry of Home Affairs) were walking around in a "half dream." Some of them were said to stay up all night and would not see or talk to anyone. When questioned as to how the arrest of such a high official as Beria could happen, this official stated that after the death of Stalin anything could happen, and that nobody knew who would be arrested next.

He stated that atomic energy development led to Beria's downfall. Beria desired to get ahead of the United States in atomic development in the quickest time possible. To do so and to keep all of the developments secret, he used only personnel from his own Ministry. He did not recruit personnel from the "Military Institute" (described as an institute of military engineers), and did not consult the Army, Malenkov, or the Central Committee of the Party concerning atomic energy work. Beria also failed to keep them advised of his accomplishments and failures in the atomic energy field. In fact, he often misinformed them in this regard. The basis for his action was the necessity for secrecy, but the Central Committee "judged it differently." It was considered that misinforming the Central Committee could "play up to our enemy," particularly when "Malenkov proves he (Beria) has done it for his personal benefit."

According to this official, after Stalin's death Beria wanted to make a full and accurate report to the "Plenary Session" but was prevented from doing so. Some officers in the Ministry of Home Affairs believed that Beria

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should have been closer to Marshal Zhukov, who was personally fond of Beria, but since he did not consult Zhukov the latter would not help him. Some officers believed he completely disregarded Malenkov and Molotov and some consider his actions as intrigue against Malenkov.

This official stated that atomic energy development in the future will be in the hands of a committee of five, headed by an engineer named Dobuginsky (phonetic). Two members of the committee will be drawn from the War Department and two from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The entire committee will be subordinated to the Central Committee of the Party, as well as to Malenkov.

According to the informant, this Soviet official was of the opinion that Malenkov would not remain in power very long and that Marshal Zhukov may be the man who will succeed Malenkov.

Informant reported that this Soviet official claimed that the Russians have promised that the Chinese Communists will be taken into the United Nations by Christmas of 1953. They consider that the United States is preventing Communist China from becoming a member of the United Nations. The truce in Korea was described as nothing but "pieces of paper," and it was stated that they either have to "create a new Korea or get back to Korea." The informant is of the opinion that this statement meant fighting would again break out in Korea or the Communists would start hostilities in some other section of the world.

It was stated that the Russians would concentrate on making Tito unpopular with his own people in Yugoslavia. The Albanians and the Hungarians are not trusted by the Russians but the Croats and the Serbs in Yugoslavia will always be pro-Russian. When the time comes to eliminate Tito, the Yugoslavian people will be happy. However, this will not come about until the middle of winter (presumably the winter of 1953-1954).

In discussing current international matters and the possibility of war, the official stated that America must want war because so much money is being spent on the Army and military equipment. He stated that it is impossible for Communism and Capitalism to live in peace. They are opposites and one or the other must fall. The Russians are not ready for war and



would like to have at least a couple of years more to build up their industry. The statistics available to the Russians concerning industrial and military capacity of the United States are contradictory, depending upon who prepares them. The Ministry of Home Affairs still recommends military "annoyances" against the United States, if not direct war, anywhere in the world where it would hurt the United States most. The "Military Department" has its own statistics and the military leaders have changed their minds from time to time. The Central Committee considers the suggestions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the military, and its own analysis of the political situation. It then makes a recommendation and while Stalin was alive depended on him to make the right decision. Malenkov may not have prestige enough to dominate the various factions and make the right decisions.

It was stated that Russian "annoyances" (such as the war in Korea) may postpone any contemplated United States offensives against Russia. Russia may not have as many bombs as the United States, but one Russian bomb might do twenty times as much damage as a United States bomb (according to informant, this refers to accessibility of United States industry to bombing, rather than to the comparative size of Russian and United States bombs).

According to this official, the Russians must weaken Turkey and this action must be synchronized with action against Yugoslavia, in whatever form that might take, probably "this winter." America has no allies that can be trusted. France and Italy can be discounted. The Benelux countries are impotent. Churchill is about to die and on his death the Labour Party will again become dominant in England. It will take a typical left-wing attitude towards the United States and the military importance of England will become "zero," with the exception of a few RAF (Royal Air Force) men and some of the fleet. However, a bad harvest of grain in Russia would give the Russians a set-back.

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